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Private Incremental Regression
Shiva Prasad Kasiviswanathan∗ Kobbi Nissim† Hongxia Jin ‡
Abstract
Data is continuously generated by modern data sources, and a recent challenge in machine learning has been to
develop techniques that perform well in an incremental (streaming) setting. A variety of offline machine learning
tasks are known to be feasible under differential privacy, where generic construction exist that, given a large enough
input sample, perform tasks such as PAC learning, Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM), regression, etc. In this paper,
we investigate the problem of private machine learning, where as common in practice, the data is not given at once,
but rather arrives incrementally over time.
We introduce the problems of private incremental ERM and private incremental regression where the general
goal is to always maintain a good empirical risk minimizer for the history observed under differential privacy. Our
first contribution is a generic transformation of private batch ERM mechanisms into private incremental ERM mech-
anisms, based on a simple idea of invoking the private batch ERM procedure at some regular time intervals. We take
this construction as a baseline for comparison. We then provide two mechanisms for the private incremental regres-
sion problem. Our first mechanism is based on privately constructing a noisy incremental gradient function, which
is then used in a modified projected gradient procedure at every timestep. This mechanism has an excess empirical
risk of ≈ √d, where d is the dimensionality of the data. While from the results of Bassily et al. [2] this bound is
tight in the worst-case, we show that certain geometric properties of the input and constraint set can be used to derive
significantly better results for certain interesting regression problems. Our second mechanism which achieves this
is based on the idea of projecting the data to a lower dimensional space using random projections, and then adding
privacy noise in this low dimensional space. The mechanism overcomes the issues of adaptivity inherent with the use
of random projections in online streams, and uses recent developments in high-dimensional estimation to achieve an
excess empirical risk bound of ≈ T 1/3W 2/3, where T is the length of the stream and W is the sum of the Gaussian
widths of the input domain and the constraint set that we optimize over.
1 Introduction
Most modern data such as documents, images, social media data, sensor data, and mobile data naturally arrive in
a streaming fashion, giving rise to the challenge of incremental machine learning, where the goal is build and pub-
lish a model that evolves as data arrives. Learning algorithms are frequently run on sensitive data, such as location
information in a mobile setting, and results of such analyses could leak sensitive information. For example, Ka-
siviswanathan et al. [32] show how the results of many convex ERM problems can be combined to carry out recon-
struction attacks in the spirit of Dinur and Nissim [11]. Given this, a natural direction to explore, is whether, we can
carry out incremental machine learning, without leaking any significant information about individual entries in the
data. For example, a data scientist, might want to continuously update the regression parameter of a linear model
built on a stream of user profile data gathered from an ongoing survey, but these updates should not reveal whether
any one person participated in the survey or not.
Differential privacy [15] is a rigorous notion of privacy that is now widely studied in computer science and statis-
tics. Intuitively, differential privacy requires that datasets differing in only one entry induce similar distributions on
the output of a (randomized) algorithm. One of the strengths of differential privacy comes from the large variety of
machine learning tasks that it allows. Good generic constructions exist for tasks such as PAC learning [4, 31] and Em-
pirical Risk Minimization [41, 34, 25, 26, 48, 27, 2, 12, 51, 47]. These constructions, however, are typically focused
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on the batch (offline) setting, where information is first collected and then analyzed. Considering an incremental
setting, it is natural to ask whether these tasks can still be performed with high accuracy, under differential privacy.
In this paper, we introduce the problem of private incremental empirical risk minimization (ERM) and provide
algorithms for this new setting. Our particular focus will be on the problem of private incremental linear regression.
Let us start with a description of the traditional batch convex ERM framework. Given a dataset and a constraint
space C, the goal in ERM is to pick a θ ∈ C that minimizes the empirical error (risk). Formally, given n datapoints
z1, . . . , zn from some domain Z, and a closed, convex set C ⊆ Rd, consider the optimization problem:
min
θ∈C
J (θ; z1, . . . , zn) where J (θ; z1, . . . , zn) =
n∑
i=1
(θ; zi). (1)
The loss function J : C×Zn → R measures the fit of θ ∈ C to the given data z1, . . . , zn, the function  : C×Z → R
is the loss associated with a single datapoint and is assumed to be convex in the first parameter θ for every z ∈ Z. It is
common to assume that the loss function has certain properties, e.g., positive valued. The M-estimator (true empirical
risk minimizer) θˆ associated with a given a function J (θ; z1, . . . , zn) ≥ 0 is defined as:1
θˆ ∈ argminθ∈C J (θ; z1, . . . , zn) = argminθ∈C
n∑
i=1
(θ; zi).
This type of program captures a variety of empirical risk minimization (ERM) problems, e.g., the MLE (Maximum
Likelihood Estimators) for linear regression is captured by setting (θ; z) = (y−〈x, θ〉)2 in (1), where z = (x, y) for
x ∈ Rd and y ∈ R. Similarly, the MLE for logistic regression is captured by setting (θ; z) = ln(1+exp(−y〈x, θ〉)).
Another common example is the support vector machine (SVM), where (θ; z) = hinge(y〈x, θ〉), where hinge(a) =
1− a if a ≤ 1 and 0 otherwise.
The main focus of this paper will be on a particularly important ERM problem of linear regression. Linear
regression is a popular statistical technique that is commonly used to model the relationship between the outcome
(label) and the explanatory variables (covariates). Informally, in a linear regression, given n covariate-response pairs
(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈ Rd × R, we wish to find a (regression) parameter vector θˆ such that 〈xi, θˆ〉 ≈ yi for most
i’s. Specifically, let y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn denote a vector of the responses, and let X ∈ Rn×d be the design
matrix where x⊤i is the ith row. Consider the linear model: y = Xθ⋆ +w, where w is the noise vector, the goal in
linear regression is to estimate the unknown regression vector θ⋆. Assuming that the noise vector w = (w1, . . . , wn)
follows a (sub)Gaussian distribution, estimating the vector θ⋆ amounts to solving the “ordinary least squares” (OLS)
problem:
θˆ ∈ argminθ
n∑
i=1
(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2.
Typically, for additional guarantees such as sparsity, stability, etc., θ is constrained to be from a convex set C ⊂ Rd.
Popular choices of C include theL1-ball (referred to as Lasso regression) and L2-ball (referred to as Ridge regression).
In an incremental setting, the (xi, yi)’s arrive over time, and the goal in incremental linear regression is to maintain
over time (an estimate of) the regression parameter. We provide a more detailed background on linear regression in
Appendix A.1.
Incremental Setting. In an incremental setting the data arrives in a stream at discrete time intervals. The incremental
setting is a variant of the traditional batch setting capturing the fact that modern data is rarely collected at one single
time and more commonly data gathering and analysis may be interleaved. An incremental algorithm is modeled as
follows: at each timestep the algorithm receives an input from the stream, computes, and produces outputs. Typically,
constraints are placed on the algorithm in terms of some computational resource (such as memory, computation time)
availability. In this paper, the challenge in this setting comes from the differential privacy constraint because frequent
releases about the data can lead to privacy loss (see, e.g., [11, 32]).
We focus on the incremental ERM problem. In this problem setting, the data z1, . . . , zT ∈ Z arrives one point
at each timestep t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. The goal of an incremental ERM algorithm is to release at each timestep t, an
estimator that minimizes the risk measured on the data z1, . . . , zt. In more concrete terms, the goal is to output θˆt at
every t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, where:
Incremental ERM: θˆt ∈ argminθ∈C
t∑
i=1
(θ; zi).
1This formulation also captures regularized ERM, in which an additional convex function R(θ) is added to the loss function to penalize certain
type of solutions, e.g., “penalize” for the “complexity” of θ. The loss function J (θ; z1, . . . , zn) then equals
∑n
i=1 (θ; zi) + R(θ), which is
same as replacing (θ; zi) by (θ; zi) +R(θ)/n in (1).
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The goal of private incremental ERM algorithm, is to (differential) privately estimate θˆt at every t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.2 In
this paper, we develop the first private incremental ERM algorithms.
There is a long line of work in designing differentially private algorithms for empirical risk minimization problems
in the batch setting [41, 34, 26, 48, 27, 2, 12, 51, 47]. A naive approach to transform the existing batch techniques to
work in the incremental model is by using them to recompute the outcome after each datapoint’s arrival. However,
for achieving an overall fixed level of differential privacy, this would result in an unsatisfactory loss in terms of utility.
Precise statements can be obtained using composition properties of differential privacy (as in Theorem A.4), but
informally if a differentially private algorithm is executed T times on the same input, then the privacy parameter (ǫ in
Definition 4) degrades by a factor of ≈ √T , and this affects the overall utility of this approach as the utility bounds
typically depend inversely on the privacy parameter. Therefore, the above naive approach will suffer an additional
multiplicative factor of ≈ √T over the risk bounds obtained for the batch case. Our goal is to obtain risk bounds
in the incremental setting that are comparable to those in the batch setting, i.e., bounds that do not suffer from this
additional penalty of
√
T .
Generalization. For the kind of problems we consider in this paper, if the process generating the data satisfies the
conditions for generalization (e.g., if the data stream contains datapoints where each datapoint is sampled indepen-
dent and identically from an unknown distribution), the incremental ERM would converge to the true risk on the
distribution (via uniform convergence and other ideas, refer to [53, 43, 2] for more details). In this case, the model
learned in an incremental fashion will have a good predictive accuracy on unseen arriving data. If however, the data
does not satisfy these conditions, then θˆt can be viewed as a “summarizer” for the data seen so far. Generating these
summaries could also be useful in many applications, e.g., the regression parameter can be used to explain the as-
sociations between the outcome (yi’s) and the covariates (xi’s). These associations are regularly used in domains
such as public health, social sciences, biological studies, to understand whether specific variables are important (e.g.,
statistically significant) or unimportant predictors of the outcome. In practice, these associations would need to be
constantly re-evaluated over time as new data arrives.
Comparison to Online Learning. Online learning (or sequential prediction) is another well-studied setting for
learning when the data arrives in a sequential order. There are differences between the goals of incremental and
online learning. In online ERM learning, the aim is to provide an estimator θ˜t that can be used for future prediction.
More concretely, at time t, an online learner, chooses θ˜t and then the adversary picks zt and the learner suffers loss of
(θ˜t; zt). Online learners try to minimize regret defined as the difference between the cumulative loss of the learner
and the cumulative loss of the best fixed decision at the end of T rounds [42]. In an incremental setting, the algorithm
gets to observe zt before committing to the estimator, and the goal is to ensure at each timestep t, the algorithm
maintains a single estimator that minimizes the risk on the history. There are strong lower bounds on the achievable
regret for online ERM learning. In particular, even under the differential privacy constraint, the excess risk bounds on
incremental learning that we obtain here have better dependence on T (stream length) than the regret lower bounds
for online ERM. Incremental learning model should be viewed as a variant of batch (offline) learning model, where
the data arrives over time, and the goal is to output intermediate results.
1.1 Our Results
Before stating our results, let us define how we measure success of our algorithms. As is standard in ERM, we
measure the quality of our algorithm by the worst-case (over inputs) excess (empirical) risk (defined as the difference
from the minimum possible risk over a function class). In an incremental setting, we want this excess risk to be
always small for any sequence of inputs. The following definition captures this requirement. All our algorithms are
randomized, and they take a confidence parameter β and produce bounds that hold with probability at least 1− β.
Definition 1. A (randomized) incremental algorithm is an (α, β)-estimator for loss function J , if with probability at
least 1 − β over the coin flips of the algorithm, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, after processing a prefix of the stream of
length t, it generates an output θt ∈ C that satisfies the following bound on excess (empirical) risk:
J (θt; z1, . . . , zt)−J (θˆt; z1, . . . , zt) ≤ α,
where θˆt ∈ argminθ∈C J (θ; z1, . . . , zt) is the true empirical risk minimizer. Here, α is referred to as the bound on
the excess risk.
2A point to note in the above description, while we have the privacy constraint, we have placed no computational constraints on the algorithm.
In particular, the above description allows also those algorithms that at time t use the whole input history z1, . . . , zt. However, as we will discuss
in Sections 4 and 5, our proposed approaches for private incremental regression are also efficient in terms of their resource requirements.
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Incremental ERM
Problem Objective
Bound on the Excess (Empirical) Risk under (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy
(α in Definition 1)
1 Convex Function(using a generic transformation)
(Td)
1
3 log
5
2 (1/δ)
ǫ2/3
2 Strongly Convex Function(using a generic transformation)
√
d log4(1/δ)
ν1/2ǫ
3 Linear Regression
Mech 1:
√
d
√
log(1/δ)
ǫ
Mech 2: T
1
3 W
2
3
√
log(1/δ)
ǫ
+ T
1
6W
1
3
√
OPT+ T
1
4W
1
2
4
√
OPT
(where W = w(X ) + w(C) and OPT is the minimum empirical risk at timestep T )
Table 1: Summary of our results. The stream length is T and d is the dimensionality of the data (number of covariates
in the case of regression). The bounds are stated for the setting where both the Lipschitz constant of the function and
‖C‖ are scaled to 1. The bounds ignore polylog factors in d and T , and the value in the table gives the bound when
it is below T , i.e., the bounds should be read as min{T, ·}. ν is the strong convexity parameter. For the regression
problem, X is the domain from which the inputs (covariates) are drawn and C is the constraint space. OPT stands for
the minimum empirical risk at time T . The exact results are provided in Theorems 3.1, 4.2, and 5.7, respectively.
In this paper, we propose incremental ERM algorithms that provide a differential privacy guarantee on data
streams. Informally, differential privacy requires that the output of a data analysis mechanism is not overly affected
by any single entry in the input dataset. In the case of incremental setting, we insist that this guarantee holds at each
timestep for all outputs produced up to that timestep (precise definition in Section 2). This would imply that, an
adversary is unable to determine whether a particular datapoint was present or not in the input stream by observing
the output of the algorithm over time. Two parameters, ǫ and δ control the level of privacy. Very roughly, ǫ is an
upper bound on the amount of influence an individual datapoint has on the outcome and δ is the probability that this
bound fails to hold (for a precise interpretation, refer to [30]), so the definition becomes more stringent as ǫ, δ → 0.
Therefore, while parameters α, β measure the accuracy of an incremental algorithm, the parameters ǫ, δ represent
its privacy risk. Our private incremental algorithms take ǫ, δ as parameters and satisfies: a) the differential privacy
constraint with parameters ǫ, δ and b) (α, β)-estimator property (Definition 1) for every β > 0 and some α (parameter
that the algorithm tries to minimize).
There is a trivial differentially private incremental ERM algorithm that completely ignores the input and outputs
at every t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, any θ ∈ C (this scheme is private as the output is always independent of the input). The
excess risk of this algorithm is at most 2TL‖C‖,3 where L is the Lipschitz constant of  (Definition 8) and ‖C‖ is
the maximum attained norm in the convex set C (Definition 2). All bounds presented in this paper, as also true for
all other existing results in the private ERM literature, are only interesting in the regime where they are less than this
trivial bound.
For the purposes of this section, we make some simplifying assumptions and omit4 dependence on all but key
variables (dimension d and stream length T ). Slightly more detailed bounds are stated in Table 1. All our algorithms
run in time polynomial in d and T (exact bounds depend on the time needed for Euclidean projection onto the con-
straint set which will differ based on the constraint set). Additionally, our private incremental regression algorithms,
which utilize the Tree Mechanism of [16, 7] have space requirement whose dependence on the stream length T is
only logarithmic.
(1) A Generic Transformation. A natural first question is whether non-trivial private ERM algorithms exist in gen-
eral for the incremental setting. Our first contribution is to answer this question in the affirmative – we present
a simple generic transformation of private batch ERM algorithms into private incremental ERM algorithms. The
construction idea is simple: rather than invoking the batch ERM algorithm every timestep, the batch ERM algo-
rithm is invoked every τ timesteps, where τ is chosen to balance the excess risk factor coming from the stale risk
minimizer (because of inaction) with the excess risk factor coming from the increased privacy noise due to reuse of
the data. Using this idea along with recent results of Bassily et al. [2] for private batch ERM, we obtain an excess
3This follows as in each timestep t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, for any θ ∈ C, J (θ; z1, . . . , zt)−J (θˆt; z1, . . . , zt) ≤ tL‖θ− θˆt‖ ≤ tL(‖θ‖+‖θˆt‖) ≤
2tL‖C‖ ≤ 2TL‖C‖.
4This includes parameters ǫ, δ, β, ‖C‖, and the Lipschitz constant of the loss function.
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risk bound (α in Definition 1) of O˜(min{(Td)1/3, T}).5 Using this same framework, we also show that when the
loss function is strongly convex (Definition 9) the excess risk bound can be improved to O˜(min{√d, T}).
A follow-up question is: how much worse is this private incremental ERM risk bound compared to best known
private batch ERM risk bound (with a sample size of T datapoints)? In the batch setting, the results of Bassily et al.
[2] establish that for any convex ERM problem, it is possible to achieve an excess risk bound of O˜(min{√d, T})
(which is also tight in general). Therefore, our transformation from the batch to incremental setting, causes the
excess risk to increase by at most a factor of ≈ max{T 1/3/d1/6, 1}. Note that even for a low-dimensional setting
(small d case), the factor increase in excess risk of≈ T 1/3 (as now max{T 1/3/d1/6, 1} ≈ T 1/3) is much smaller
than the factor increase of ≈ T 1/2 for the earlier described naive approach based on using a private batch ERM
algorithm at every timestep. The situation only improves for larger dimensional data.
(2) Private Incremental Linear Regression Using Tree Mechanism. We show that we can improve the generic
construction from (1) for the important problem of linear regression. We do so by introducing the notion of a
private gradient function (Definition 5) that allows differentially private evaluation of the gradient at any θ ∈ C.6
More formally, for any θ ∈ C, a private gradient function allows differentially private evaluation of the gradient at
θ to within a small error (with high probability). Since the data arrives continually, our algorithm utilizes the Tree
Mechanism of [16, 7] to continually update the private gradient function. Now given access to a private gradient
function, we can use any first-order convex optimization technique (such as projected gradient descent) to privately
estimate the regression parameter. The idea is, since these optimization techniques operate by iteratively taking
steps in the direction opposite to the gradient evaluated at the current point, we can use a private gradient function
for evaluating all the required gradients. Using this, we design a private regression algorithm for the incremental
setting, that achieves an excess risk bound of O˜(min{√d, T}). It is easy to observe, for private incremental
linear regression, this result improves the bounds from the generic construction above for any choice of d, T (as
min{√d, T} ≤ min{(Td)1/3, T}).7
Ignoring polylog factors, this worst-case bound matches the lower bounds on the excess risk for squared-loss
in the batch case [2], implying that this bound cannot be improved in general (an excess risk upper bound for a
problem in the incremental setting trivially holds for the same problem in the batch setting).
(3) Private Incremental Linear Regression: Going Beyond Worst-Case. The noise added in our previous solution
(2) grows approximately as the square root of the input dimension (for sufficiently large T ), which could be pro-
hibitive for a high-dimensional input. While in a worst-case setup this, as we discussed above, seems unavoidable,
we investigate whether certain geometric properties of the input/output space could be used to obtain better results
in certain interesting scenarios.
A natural strategy for reducing the dependence of the excess risk bounds on d is to use dimensionality reduc-
tion techniques such as the Johnson-Lindenstrauss Transform (JLT): The server performing the computation can
choose a random projection matrix Φ ∈ Rm×d which is then used for projecting all the xi’s (covariates) onto a
lower-dimensional space. The advantage being that, using the techniques from (2), one could privately minimize
the excess risk in the projected subspace, and in doing so, the dependence on the dimension in excess risk is
reduced to ≈ √m (from ≈ √d).8 However, there are two significant challenges in implementing this idea for
incremental regression, both of which we overcome using geometric ideas.
The first one being that this only solves the problem in the projected subspace, whereas our goal is to produce
an estimate to true empirical risk minimizer. To achieve this we would need to “lift” back the solution from
the projected subspace to the original space. We do so by using recent developments in the problem of high
dimensional estimation with constraints [54]. The Gaussian width of the constraint space C plays an important
role in this analysis. Gaussian width is a well-studied quantity in convex geometry that captures the geometric
complexity of any set of vectors.9 The rough idea here being that a good estimation (lifting) can be done from
few observations (small m) as long as the constraint set C has small Gaussian width. Many popular sets have low
Gaussian width, e.g., the width of L1-ball (Bd1 is Θ(
√
log d), and that of set of all sparse vectors in Rd with at
most k non-zero entries is Θ(
√
k log(d/k)).
The second challenge comes from the incremental nature of input generation, because it allows for generation
5For simplicity of exposition, the O˜(·) notation hides factors polynomial in log T and log d.
6Intuitively, this would imply that for any θ ∈ C, the output of a private gradient function cannot be used to distinguish two streams that are
almost the same (differential privacy guarantee).
7A linear regression instance typically does not satisfy strong convexity requirements.
8A point to note that this use of random projections for linear regression is different from its typical use in prior work [57], where they are used
not for reducing dimensionality but rather for reducing the number of samples used in the regression computation, and hence improving in running
time.
9For a set S ⊆ Rd, Gaussian width is defined as w(S) = Eg∈N (0,1)d [supa∈S〈a,g〉].
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of xi’s after Φ is fixed. This is an issue because the guarantees of random projections, such as JL transform,
only hold if the inputs on which it is applied are chosen before choosing the transformation. For example, given
a random projection matrix Φ ∈ Rm×d with m ≪ d, it is simple to generate x such that the norm on x is
substantially different from the norm of Φx.10 Again to deal with these kind of adaptive choice of inputs, we rely
on the geometric properties of problem. In particular, we use Gordon’s theorem that states that one can embed
a set of points S on a unit sphere into a (much) lower-dimensional space Rm using a Gaussian random matrix11
Φ such that, supa∈S |‖Φa‖2 − ‖a‖2| is small (with high probability), provided m is at least the square of the
Gaussian width of S [21]. In a sense, w(S)2 can be thought as the “effective dimension” of S, so projecting the
data onto m ≈ w(S)2 dimensional space suffices for guaranteeing the above condition.
Using the above geometric ideas, and the Tree Mechanism to incrementally construct the private gradient
function (as in (2)), we present our second private algorithm for incremental regression, with an
O˜(min{T 13W 23 + T 16W 13
√
OPT + T
1
4W
1
2
4
√
OPT, T})
excess risk bound, where W = w(X ) + w(C), X ⊂ Rd is the domain from which the xi’s (covariates) are
drawn, and OPT is the true minimum empirical risk at time T . As we discuss in Section 5, for many practically
interesting regression instances, such as when X is a domain of sparse vectors, and C is bounded by an L1-ball
(as is the case of popular Lasso regression) or is a polytope defined by polynomial (in dimension) many vertices,
W ≈ polylog(d), in which case the risk bound can be simplified to O˜(min{T 13 +T 16√OPT+T 14 4√OPT, T}).
In most practical scenarios, when the relationship between covariates and response satisfy a linear relationship, one
would also expect OPT≪ T . These bounds show that, for certain instances, it is possible to design differentially
private risk minimizers in the incremental setting with excess risk that depends only poly-logarithmically on the
dimensionality of the data, a desired feature in a high-dimensional setting.
Organization. In Section 1.2, we discuss some related work. In Section 2, we present some preliminaries. Our
generic transformation from a private batch ERM algorithm to a private incremental ERM algorithm is given in
Section 3. We present techniques that improve upon these bounds for the problem of private incremental regression
in Sections 4 and 5. The appendices contain some proof details and supplementary material. In Appendix B, we
analyze the convergence rate of a noisy projected gradient descent technique, and in Appendix C, we present the Tree
Mechanism of [16, 7].
1.2 Related Work
Private ERM. Starting from the works of Chaudhuri et al. [8, 9], private convex ERM problems have been studied in
various settings including the low-dimensional setting [41, 34], high-dimensional sparse regression setting [34, 48],
online learning setting [25, 49, 27, 37], local privacy setting [12], and interactive setting [26, 51].
Bassily et al. [2] presented algorithms that for a general convex loss function (θ; z) which is 1-Lipschitz (Def-
inition 8) for every z, achieves an expected excess risk of ≈ √d under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy and ≈ d under
ǫ-differential privacy (ignoring the dependence on other parameters for simplicity).12 We use their batch mechanisms
in our generic construction to obtain risk bounds for incremental ERM problems (Theorem 3.1). They also showed
that these bounds cannot be improved in general, even for the least-squares regression function. However, if the
constraint space has low Gaussian width (such as with the L1-ball), Talwar et al. [47, 46] recently showed that, under
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, the above bound can be improved by exploiting the geometric properties of the constraint
space. An analogous result under ǫ-differential privacy for the class of generalized linear functions (which includes
linear, logistic regression) was recently obtained by Kasiviswanathan and Jin [29]. Our excess risk bounds based
on Gaussian width (presented in Section 5) uses a lifting procedure similar to that used by Kasiviswanathan and
Jin [29]. All of these above algorithms operate in the batch setting, and ours is the first work dealing with private
ERM problems in an incremental setting.
Private Online Convex Optimization. Differentially private algorithms have also been designed for a large class of
online (convex optimization) learning problems, in both the full information and bandit settings [25, 49, 27]. Adapting
the popular Follow the Approximate Leader framework [23], Smith and Thakurta [49] obtained regret bounds for
private online learning with nearly optimal dependence on T (though the dependence on the dimensionality d in these
results is much worse than the known lower bounds). As discussed earlier, incremental learning is a variant of the
batch learning, with goals different from online learning.
10Note that this issue arises independent of the differential privacy requirements, and holds even in a non-private incremental setting.
11Recent results [5] have shown other distributions for generating Φ also provide similar guarantees.
12Better risk bounds were achieved under strong convexity assumptions [2, 47].
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Private Incremental Algorithms. Dwork et al. [16] introduced the problem of counting under incremental (contin-
ual) observations. The goal is to monitor a stream of T bits, and continually release a counter of the number of 1’s
that have been observed so far, under differential privacy. The elegant Tree Mechanism introduced by Dwork et al.
[16] and Chan et al. [7] solves this problem, under ǫ-differential privacy, with error roughly log5/2 T . The versatility
of this mechanism has been utilized in different ways in subsequent works [49, 17, 24]. We use the Tree Mechanism
as a basic building block for computing the private gradient function incrementally. Dwork et al. [16] also achieve
pan-privacy for their continual release (which means that the mechanism preserves differential privacy even when
an adversary can observe snapshots of the mechanism’s internal states), a property that we do not investigate in this
paper.
Use of JL Transform for Privacy. The use of JL transform for achieving differential privacy with better utility has
been well documented for a variety of computational tasks [58, 3, 33, 44, 52]. Blocki et al. [3] have shown that if
Φ ∈ Rm×n is a Gaussian random matrix of appropriate dimension, then ΦX ∈ Rm×d is differentially private if the
least singular value of the matrix X ∈ Rn×d is “sufficiently” large. The bound on the least singular value was recently
improved by Sheffet [44]. Here the privacy comes as a result of randomization inherent in the transform. However,
these results require that the projection matrix is kept private, which is an issue in an incremental setting, where an
adversary could learn about Φ over time. Kenthapadi et al. [33] use Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform to publish a
private sketch that enables estimation of the distance between users. Their main idea is based on projecting a d-
dimensional user feature vector into a lower m-dimensional space by first applying a random Johnson-Lindenstrauss
transform and then adding Gaussian noise to each entry of the resulting vector. None of these above results deal with
an incremental setting, where applying the JL transform is itself a challenge because of the adaptivity issues.
Traditional Streaming Algorithms. The literature on streaming algorithms is replete with various techniques that
can solve linear regression and related problems on various streaming models of computation under various computa-
tional resource constraints. We refer the reader to the survey by Woodruff [57] for more details. However, incremental
regression under differential privacy, poses a different challenge than that faced by traditional streaming algorithms.
The issue is that the solution (regression parameter) at each timestep relies on all the datapoints observed in the past,
and frequent releases about earlier points can lead to privacy loss.
2 Preliminaries
Notation and Data Normalization. We denote [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Vectors are in column-wise fashion, denoted by
boldface letters. For a vector v, v⊤ denotes its transpose, ‖v‖ it’s Euclidean (L2-) norm, and ‖v‖1 it’s L1-norm. For
a matrix M , ‖M‖ denotes its spectral norm which equals its largest singular value, and ‖M‖F its Frobenius norm.
We use 0 to denote a d-dimensional vector of all zeros. The d-dimensional unit ball in Lp-norm centered at origin is
denoted by Bdp . Id represents the d× d identity matrix. N (µ,Σ) denotes the Gaussian distribution with mean vector
µ and covariance matrix Σ. For a variable n, we use poly(n) to denote a polynomial function of n and polylog(n)
to denote poly(log(n)).
We assume all streams are of a fixed length T , which is known to the algorithm. We make this assumption for
simplifying the discussion. In fact, in our presented generic transformation for incremental ERM this assumption can
be straightforwardly removed. Whereas in the case of algorithms for private incremental regression this assumption
can be removed by using a simple trick13 introduced by Chan et al. [7]. For a stream Γ, we use Γt to denote the
stream prefix of length t.
Throughout this paper, we use ℓ and L to indicate the least-squared loss on a single datapoint and a collection of
datapoints, respectively. Namely,
ℓ(θ; (x, y)) = (y − 〈x, θ〉)2 and
L(θ; (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)) =∑ni=1 ℓ(θ; (xi, yi)).
In Appendix A, we review a few additional definitions related to convex functions and Gaussian concentration.
For a set of vectors, we define its diameter as the maximum attained norm in the set.
Definition 2. (Diameter of Set) The diameter ‖C‖ of a closed set C ⊆ Rd, is defined as ‖C‖ = supθ∈C ‖θ‖.
13Chan et al. [7] presented a scheme that provides a generic way for converting the Tree Mechanism that requires prior knowledge of T into a
mechanism that does not. They also showed that this new mechanism (referred to as the Hybrid Mechanism) achieves asymptotically the same error
guarantees as the Tree Mechanism. The same ideas work in our case too, and the asymptotic excess risk bounds are not affected.
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For improving the worst-case dependence on dimension d, we exploit the geometric properties of the input and
constraint space. We use the well-studied quantity of Gaussian width that captures the L2-geometric complexity of a
set S ⊆ Rd.
Definition 3 (Gaussian Width). Given a closed set S ⊆ Rd, its Gaussian width w(S) is defined as:
w(S) = Eg∈N (0,1)d [sup
a∈S
〈a,g〉].
In particular, w(S)2 can be thought as the “effective dimension” of S. Many popular convex sets have low
Gaussian width, e.g., the width of both the unit L1-ball in Rd (Bd1 ) and the standard d-dimensional probability
simplex equals Θ(
√
log d), and the width of any ball Bdp for 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ is ≈ d1−1/p. For a set C contained in the
Bd2 , w(C) is always O(
√
d). Another prominent set with low Gaussian width is that made up of sparse vectors. For
example, the set of all k-sparse vectors (with at most k non-zero entries) in Rd has Gaussian width Θ(
√
k log(d/k)).
Differential Privacy on Streams. We will consider differential privacy on data streams [16]. A stream is a sequence
of points from some domain set Z. We say that two streams Γ,Γ′ ∈ Z∗ of the same length are neighbors if there
exists a datapoint z ∈ Γ and z′ ∈ Z such that if we change z in Γ to z′ we get the stream Γ′. The result of an
algorithm processing a stream is a sequence of outputs.
Definition 4 (Event-level differential privacy [15, 16]). Algorithm Alg is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private14 if for all neigh-
boring streams Γ,Γ′ and for all sets of possible output sequences R ⊆ RN, we have
Pr[Alg(Γ) ∈ R] ≤ exp(ǫ) · Pr[Alg(Γ′) ∈ R] + δ,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the algorithm. When δ = 0, the algorithm Alg is ǫ-differentially
private.
We provide additional background on differential privacy along with some techniques for achieving it in Ap-
pendix A.2.
3 Private Incremental ERM: A Generic Mechanism
We present a generic transformation for converting any private batch ERM algorithm into a private incremental ERM
algorithm. We take this construction as a baseline for comparison for our private incremental regression algorithms.
Mechanism PRIVINCERM describes this simple transformation. At every timestep, Mechanism PRIVINCERM
outputs a θprivt , a differentially private approximation of
θˆt ∈ argminθ∈C J (θ; z1, . . . , zt), where J (θ; z1, . . . , zt) =
t∑
i=1
(θ; zi).
The idea is to perform “relevant” computations only every τ timesteps, thereby ensuring that no zi is used in
more than T/τ invocations of the private batch ERM algorithm (for simplicity, assume that T is a multiple of τ ).
This idea is reminiscent of mini-batch processing ideas commonly used in big data processing [6]. In Theorem 3.1,
the parameter τ is set to balance the increase in excess risk due to lack of updates on the estimator and the increase
in the excess risk due to the change in the privacy risk parameter ǫ (which arises from multiple interactions with the
data).
Mechanism PRIVINCERM invokes a differentially private (batch) ERM algorithm for timesteps t which are a
multiple of τ , and in all other timesteps it just outputs the result from the previous timestep. In Step 5 of Mecha-
nism PRIVINCERM any differentially private batch ERM algorithm can be used, and this step dominates the time
complexity of this mechanism. Here we present excess risk bounds obtained by invoking Mechanism PRIVINCERM
with the differentially private ERM algorithms of Bassily et al. [2] and Talwar et al. [46]. As mentioned earlier, the
bounds of Bassily et al. [2] are tight in the worst-case. But as shown by Talwar et al. [46], if the constraint space C has
a small Gaussian width, then these bounds could be improved. The bounds of Talwar et al. depend on the curvature
constant of  defined as:
C = sup
z∈Z
sup
θa,θb∈C,l∈(0,1],θc=θa+l(θb−θa)
2
l2
((θc; z)− (θa; z)− 〈θc − θa,∇(θa; z)〉).
14In the practice of differential privacy, we generally think of ǫ as a small non-negligible constant, and δ as a parameter that is cryptographically
small.
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Mechanism 1: PRIVINCERM (ǫ, δ)
Input: A stream Γ = z1, . . . , zT , where each zt is from the domain Z ⊆ Rd, and τ ∈ N
Output: A differentially private estimate of θˆt ∈ argminθ∈C
∑t
i=1 (θ; zi) at every timestep t ∈ [T ]
1 Set ǫ′ ← ǫ(
2
√
2T
τ ln(
2
δ )
) and δ′ ← δτ2T
2 θpriv0 ← 0
3 for all t ∈ [T ] do
4 if t is a multiple of τ then
5 θprivt ← Output of an (ǫ′, δ′)-differentially private algorithm minimizing J (θ; z1, . . . , zt)
6 end
7 else
8 θprivt ← θprivt−1
9 end
10 Return θprivt
11 end
For linear regression where (θ; z) = ℓ(θ; (x, y)) = (y − 〈x, θ〉)2, then with ‖x‖ ≤ 1 and |y| ≤ 1, it follows that
Cℓ ≤ ‖C‖2 [10].
We now show that Mechanism PRIVINCERM is event-level differentially private (Definition 4), and analyze its
utility under various invocations in Step 5.
Theorem 3.1. Mechanism PRIVINCERM is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to a single datapoint change in
the stream Γ. Also,
1. (Using Theorem 2.4, Bassily et al. [2]). If the function (θ; z) : C × Z → R is a positive-valued function that is
convex with respect to θ over the domain C ⊆ Rd. Then for any β > 0, with probability at least 1 − β, for each
t ∈ [T ], θprivt generated by Mechanism PRIVINCERM with τ = ⌈ (Td)
1/3
ǫ2/3
⌉ satisfies:
J (θprivt ; Γt)−min
θ∈C
J (θ; Γt) = O
(
min{ (Td)
1/3L‖C‖ log5/2(1/δ) polylog(T/β)
ǫ2/3
, TL‖C‖}
)
,
where L is the Lipschitz parameter of the function .
2. (Using Theorem 2.4, Bassily et al. [2]). If the function (θ; z) : C × Z → R is a positive-valued function which
is ν-strongly convex with respect to θ over the domain C ⊆ Rd. Then for any β > 0, with probability at least
1− β, for each t ∈ [T ], θprivt generated by Mechanism PRIVINCERM with τ = ⌈
√
dL
(ν1/2ǫ‖C‖1/2)⌉ satisfies:
J (θprivt ; Γt)−min
θ∈C
J (θ; Γt) = O
(
min{
√
dL3/2‖C‖1/2 log4(1/δ)polylog(T/β)
ν1/2ǫ
, TL‖C‖}
)
,
where L is the Lipschitz parameter of the function .
3. (Using Theorem 2.6 of Talwar et al. [46]). If the function (θ; z) : C ×Z → R is a positive-valued function that
is convex with respect to θ over the domain C ⊆ Rd. Then for any β > 0, with probability at least 1− β, for each
t ∈ [T ], θprivt generated by Mechanism PRIVINCERM with τ = ⌈
√
Tw(C)C1/4
((L‖C‖)1/4ǫ1/2)⌉ satisfies:
J (θprivt ; Γt)−min
θ∈C
J (θ; Γt) = O
(
min{
√
Tw(C)C1/4 (L‖C‖)3/4 log7/3(1/δ) polylog(T/β)
ǫ1/2
, TL‖C‖}
)
,
where L is the Lipschitz parameter and C is the curvature constant of the function .
Proof. Privacy Analysis. Each zi is accessed at most T/τ times by the algorithm invoked in Step 5. Let l = T/τ .
By using the composition Theorem A.4 with δ∗ = δ/2 it follows that the entire algorithm is (ǫ′
√
2l ln(2/δ) +
2lǫ′2, l · (δ/2l) + δ/2)-differentially private. We set ǫ′ as ǫ/2 = ǫ′√2l ln(2/δ). Note that with this setting of ǫ′,
2lǫ′2 ≤ ǫ/2, therefore, ǫ′√2l ln(2/δ)+2lǫ′2 ≤ ǫ. Hence, Mechanism PRIVINCERM is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
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Utility Analysis. If T < τ , algorithm does not access the data, and in that case, the excess risk can be bounded by
TL‖C‖. Now assume T ≥ τ . Note that the algorithm performs no computation when t is not a multiple of τ . Let
Γt denote the prefix of stream Γ till time t. Let t lie in the interval of [jτ, (j + 1)τ ] for some j ∈ N. The total loss
accumulated by the algorithm at time t can be split as:
t∑
i=1
(θprivt ; zi) =
jτ∑
i=1
(θprivjτ ; zi) +
t∑
i=jτ+1
(θprivjτ ; zi) ≤
jτ∑
i=1
(θprivjτ ; zi) + τL‖C‖,
as θprivt = θ
priv
jτ .
Let θˆt ∈ argminθ∈C
∑t
i=1 (θ; zi). As  is positive-valued,
t∑
i=1
(θˆt; zi) ≥
jτ∑
i=1
(θˆt; zi) ≥
jτ∑
i=1
(θˆjτ ; zi).
Hence, we get,
t∑
i=1
(θprivt ; zi)−
t∑
i=1
(θˆt; zi) ≤
jτ∑
i=1
(θprivjτ ; zi)−
jτ∑
i=1
(θˆjτ ; zi) + τL‖C‖.
Using the results from Bassily et al. [2] or Talwar et al. [46] to bound ∑jτi=1 (θprivjτ ; zi) −∑jτi=1 (θˆjτ ; zi), setting
τ to balance the various opposing terms, and a final union bound provide the claimed bounds.
4 Private Incremental Linear Regression using Tree Mechanism
We now focus on the problem of private incremental linear regression. Our first approach for this problem is based
on a private incremental computation of the gradient. The algorithm is particularly effective in the regime of large T
and small d. A central idea of our approach is the construction of a private gradient function defined as follows.
Definition 5. Let C ⊆ Rd. Algorithm Alg computes an (α, β)-accurate gradient of the loss function J (θ; z1, . . . , zt)
with respect to θ ∈ C, if given z1, . . . , zt ∈ Z it outputs a function gt : C → Rd such that:
(i) Privacy: Alg is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private (as in Definition 4), i.e., for all neighboring streams Γ,Γ′ ∈ Z∗ and
subsets R ⊆ C → Rd,
Pr[Alg(Γ) ∈ R] ≤ exp(ǫ) · Pr[Alg(Γ′) ∈ R] + δ.
(ii) Utility: The function gt is an (α, β)-approximation to the true gradient, in that,
Pr
Alg
[
max
z1,...,zt∈Z,θ∈C
‖gt(θ)−∇J (θ; z1, . . . , zt)‖ ≥ α
]
≤ β.
Note that the output of Alg in the above definition is a function gt. The first requirement on Alg specifies that it
satisfies the differential privacy condition (Definition 4). The second requirement on Alg specifies that for any θ ∈ C,
it gives a “sufficiently” accurate estimate of the true gradient ∇J (θ; z1, . . . , zt).
LetΓ = (x1, y1), . . . , (xT , yT ) represent the stream of covariate-response pairs, we use Γt to denote (x1, y1), . . . , (xt, yt).
Consider the gradient of the loss function L(θ; Γt) where Xt ∈ Rt×d is a matrix with rows x⊤1 , . . . ,x⊤t and
yt = (y1, . . . , yt):
∇L(θ; Γt) = 2(X⊤t Xtθ −X⊤t yt) = 2
(
t∑
i=1
xix
⊤
i θ −
t∑
i=1
xiyi
)
. (2)
A simple observation from the gradient form of (2) is that if we can maintain the streaming sum of x1y1, . . . ,xT yT
and the streaming sum of x1x⊤1 , . . . ,xTx⊤T , then we can maintain the necessary ingredients needed to compute
∇L(θ; Γt) for any t ∈ [T ]. We use this observation to construct a private gradient function gt : C → Rd at every
timestep t. The idea is to privately maintain
∑T
i=1 xix
⊤
i and
∑T
i=1 xiyi over the steam using the Tree Mechanism
of [16, 7]. We present the entire construction of the Tree Mechanism in Appendix C. The rough idea behind this
mechanism is to build a binary tree where the leaves are the actual inputs from the stream, and the internal nodes
store the partial sums of all the leaves in its sub-tree. For a stream of vectors, υ1, . . . , υT in the unit ball, the Tree
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Algorithm 2: PRIVINCREG1 (ǫ, δ)
Input: A stream Γ = (x1, y1), . . . , (xT , yT ), where each (xt, yt) in Γ is from the domain X × Y where
X ⊂ Rd with ‖X‖ ≤ 1 and Y ⊂ R with ‖Y‖ ≤ 1
Output: A differentially private estimate of θˆt ∈ argminθ∈C
∑t
i=1(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2 at every timestep t ∈ [T ]
1 Set ǫ′ ← ǫ2 , δ′ ← δ2 , κ←
log3/2(T )
√
log( 1δ′ )
ǫ′ , α
′ ← O(κ‖C‖√d), and r ← Θ
((
1 + T‖C‖α′
)2)
2 for all t ∈ [T ] do
3 qt ← output of TREEMECH (ǫ′, δ′, 2) at t when invoked on the stream x1y1, . . . ,xT yT
4 Qt ← output of TREEMECH (ǫ′, δ′, 2) at t when invoked on the stream x1x⊤1 , . . . ,xTx⊤T which can be
viewed as d2-dimensional vectors (the outputs are converted back to form d× d matrices)
5 Define a private gradient function, gt : C → Rd as:
gt(θ) = 2(Qtθ − qt)
6 θprivt ← NOISYPROJGRAD(C, gt, r) (described in Appendix B)
7 Return θprivt
8 end
Mechanism allows private estimation of
∑t
i=1 υi, for every t ∈ [T ], with error roughly
√
d log2 T (under (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy, ignoring other parameters).
Somewhat similar to our approach, Smith and Thakurta also use the Tree Mechanism to maintain the sum of
gradients in their private online learning algorithm [49], however, unlike our approach, they do not construct a private
gradient function.
Once the private gradient function gt is released, it could be used to obtain an approximation to the estimator θˆ by
using any traditional gradient-based optimization technique. In this paper, we use a variant of the classical projected
gradient descent approach, described in Algorithm NOISYPROJGRAD (Appendix B). Algorithm NOISYPROJGRAD
is a iterative algorithm that takes in the constraint set C, private gradient function gt, and a parameter r denoting the
number of iterations, and returns back (θprivt ) a private estimate of regression parameter.
An important point to note is that evaluating the gradient function at different θ’s, as needed for any gradi-
ent descent technique, does not affect the privacy parameters ǫ and δ. We analyze the convergence of Algorithm
NOISYPROJGRAD in Appendix B. This convergence result (Corollary B.2) is used to set the parameter r in Algo-
rithm PRIVINCREG1.
Algorithm PRIVINCREG1 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to a single datapoint change in the stream
Γ. This follows as the L2-sensitivity of the stream in both the invocations (Steps 3 and 4) of Algorithm TREEMECH
is less than 2 (because of the normalization on the xi’s and yi’s). Using the standard composition properties (Theo-
rem A.3) of differential privacy gives that the Algorithm PRIVINCREG1 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. The algorithm
only requires O(d2 log T ) space (see Appendix C), therefore having only a logarithmic dependence on the length of
the stream. The running time of the algorithm is dominated by Steps 4 and 6; at every timestep t, Step 4 has time
complexity of O(d2 log T ), whereas the time complexity of Step 6 is r times the time complexity of projecting a
datapoint onto C (the PC operation defined in Appendix B). We now analyze the utility of this algorithm, using the
error bound on Tree Mechanism from Proposition C.1.
Lemma 4.1. For any β > 0, θ ∈ C, and t ∈ [T ], with probability at least 1 − β, the function gt defined in
Algorithm PRIVINCREG1 satisfies:
‖gt(θ)−∇L(θ; Γt)‖ = O
(
κ‖C‖(
√
d+
√
log(1/β))
)
.
Proof. Applying Proposition C.1, we know with probability at least 1− β,
∥∥qt −∑ti=1 xiyi∥∥ = O (κ(√d+√log(1/β))) and ∥∥Qt −∑ti=1 xix⊤i ∥∥ = O (κ(√d+√log(1/β))) .
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Therefore, we get with probability at least 1− β,
‖gt(θ)−∇L(θ; Γt)‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥2
(
Qt −
t∑
i=1
xix
⊤
i
)
θ − 2
(
qt −
t∑
i=1
xiyi
)∥∥∥∥∥ = O
(
κ‖C‖(
√
d+
√
log(1/β))
)
,
where we used the fact that ‖θ‖ ≤ ‖C‖ for any θ ∈ C.
Theorem 4.2. Algorithm PRIVINCREG1 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to a single datapoint change
in the stream Γ. For any β > 0, with probability at least 1 − β, for each t ∈ [T ], θprivt generated by Algo-
rithm PRIVINCREG1 satisfies:
L(θprivt ; Γt)−min
θ∈C
L(θ; Γt) = O
(
log3/2 T
√
log(1/δ)‖C‖2(√d+√log(T/β))
ǫ
)
.
Proof. The (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy follows from the above discussed global sensitivity bound.
Fix any t ∈ [T ]. Let θˆt ∈ argminθ∈C
∑t
i=1(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2. Combining Lemma 4.1 and Corollary B.2, with
probability at least 1− rβ′
L(θprivt ; Γt)−L(θˆt; Γt) = O
(
κ‖C‖2(
√
d+
√
log(1/β′))
)
.
Replacing β′ by β/r, substituting for κ, and taking a union bound over all t ∈ [T ] gives the claimed result.
Remark 4.3. For linear regression instances, which typically do not satisfy the strong convexity property, the ≈
min{(Td)1/3, T} risk bound obtained from Mechanism PRIVINCERM is substantially worse than the≈ min{√d, T}
risk bound provided by Algorithm PRIVINCREG1.
The dependence on dimension d is tight in the worst-case; due to ≈ √d excess risk lower bounds established by
Bassily et al. [2].
Remark 4.4. The techniques developed in this section (based on Tree Mechanism) can be applied to any convex
ERM problem whose gradient has a linear form, in which case we obtain an excess risk bound as in Theorem 4.2. It
is an interesting open question to obtain similar bounds for general convex ERM problems in an incremental setting.
5 Private Incremental Linear Regression: Going Beyond Worst-
Case
The noise added in Theorem 4.2 for privacy grows proportionately as
√
d. While this seems unavoidable in the
worst-case, we ask whether it is possible to go beyond this worst-case bound under some realistic assumptions. An
intuitive idea to overcome this curse of dimensionality is to project (compress) the data to a lower dimension, before
the addition of noise. In this section, we use this and other geometric ideas to cope with the high-dependency on
dimensionality in Theorem 4.2. The resulting bound will depend on the Gaussian width of the input and constraint
space which for many interesting problem instances will be smaller than
√
d. We mention some specific instantiations
and extensions of our result in Section 5.2 including a scenario when not all inputs are drawn from a domain with a
“small” Gaussian width.
Our general approach in this section will be based on this simple principle: reduce the dimensionality of the
problem, solve it privately in the lower dimensional space, and then “lift” the solution back to the original space. Our
lifting procedure is similar to that used by Kasiviswanathan and Jin [29] in their recent work on bounding excess risk
for private ERM in a batch setting.
Fix t and consider solving the following projected least-squares problem, defined as:15
Lproj(θ; Γt; Φ) =
t∑
i=1
(
yi − ‖xi‖‖Φxi‖ 〈Φxi,Φθ〉
)2
, (3)
where Φ ∈ Rm×d is a random projection matrix (to be defined later). The loss function, Lproj is also referred to as
compressed least-squares in the literature [36, 20, 28].
15The scaling factor of ‖xi‖‖Φxi‖ is for simplicity of analysis only. One could omit it and still obtain the same results using a slightly different
analysis. Also without loss of generality, we assume xi 6= 0 for all i.
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As a first step, we investigate the relationship between L(θ; Γt) and Lproj(θ; Γt; Φ). A fundamental tool in
dimensionality reduction, the Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL) lemma, states that for any set S ⊆ Rd, given γ > 0 and
m = Ω(log |S|/γ2), there exists a map that embeds the set into Rm, distorting all pairwise distances within at most
1 ± γ factor. A simple consequence of the JL Lemma is that, for any set of n vectors x1, . . . ,xn ∈ Rd, θ ∈ Rd,
γ > 0, and β > 0, if Φ is an m × d matrix with entries drawn i.i.d. from N (0, 1/m) with m = Θ(log(n/β)/γ2),
we get,
Pr [|〈Φxi,Φθ〉 − 〈xi, θ〉| ≥ γ‖xi‖‖θ‖ for all i ∈ [n]] ≤ β. (4)
Using standard inequalities such as (4), establishing the relationship between L and Lproj is relatively straightforward
in a batch setting. However, the incremental setting raises the challenge of dealing with adaptive inputs in JL transfor-
mation. The issue being that JL transformation is inherently non-adaptive, in that “success” of the JL transformation
(properties such as (4)) depends on the fact that the inputs on which it gets applied are chosen before (independent
of) fixing the transformation Φ.
To deal with this kind of adaptive generation of inputs, we use a generalization of JL lemma which yields similar
guarantees but with a much smaller (than log |S|) requirement on m, if the set S has certain geometric characteristics.
For ease of exposition, in the rest of this section, we are going to assume that Φ is a matrix in Rm×d with i.i.d. entries
fromN (0, 1/m).16 Gordon [21] showed that using a Gaussian random matrix, one can embed the set S into a lower-
dimensional space Rm, where m roughly scales as the square of Gaussian width of S. This result has found several
interesting applications in high-dimensional convex geometry, statistics, and compressed sensing [39].
Theorem 5.1 (Gordon [21]). Let Φ˜ be an m×d random matrix, whose rows φ⊤1 , . . . , φ⊤m are i.i.d. Gaussian random
vectors in Rd chosen according to the standard normal distribution N (0, Id). Let Φ = Φ˜/√m. Let S be a set of
points in Rd. There is a constant C > 0 such that for any 0 < γ, β < 1,
Pr
[
sup
a∈S
∣∣‖Φa‖2 − ‖a‖2∣∣ ≥ γ‖a‖2] ≤ β,
provided that m ≥ C
γ2
max
{
w(S)2, log
(
1
β
})
.
Note that the w(S) is defined for all sets, not just convex sets, a fact that we use below as the input domain X
may not be convex. As a simple corollary to the above theorem it also follows that,
Corollary 5.2. Under the setting of Theorem 5.1, there exists a constant C′ > 0 such that for any 0 < γ, β < 1,
Pr
[
sup
a,b∈S
|〈Φa,Φb〉 − 〈a,b〉| ≥ γ‖a‖‖b‖
]
≤ β,
provided that m ≥ C′
γ2
max
{
w(S)2, log
(
1
β
})
.
Applying the above corollary to the set of vectors in X ∪C, and by noting that w(X ∪C) ≤ w(X )+w(C), gives
that if m = Θ((1/γ2)max{(w(X ) + w(C))2, log(1/β)}), then with probability at least 1− β,
Pr
[
sup
x∈X ,θ∈C
|〈Φx,Φθ〉 − 〈x, θ〉| ≥ γ‖x‖‖θ‖
]
≤ β. (5)
5.1 Algorithm for the Streaming Setting
We now present a mechanism (Algorithm PRIVINCREG2) for private incremental linear regression based on mini-
mizing the projected least-squares objective (3), under differential privacy. The idea is to again construct a private
gradient function gt, but of function Lproj (instead of L as done in Algorithm PRIVINCREG1).
Let Xt be a matrix with rows x⊤1 , . . . ,x⊤t , and X˜t ∈ Rn×d be a matrix with rows x˜⊤1 , . . . , x˜⊤t . As before, let yt
be the vector (y1, . . . , yt). Under these notation, Lproj(θ; Γt; Φ) from (3) can be re-expressed as:
Lproj(θ; Γt; Φ) = ‖yt − X˜tΦ⊤Φθ‖2.
The gradient of Lproj with respect to Φθ equals:
∇(Φθ)Lproj(θ; Γt; Φ) = ∂ ‖yt − (X˜tΦ
⊤)(Φθ)‖2
∂ (Φθ)
= 2((X˜tΦ
⊤)⊤(X˜tΦ⊤))(Φθ)− 2(X˜tΦ⊤)⊤yt.
16One could also use other (better) constructions of Φ, such as those that create sparse Φ matrix, using recent results by Bourgain et al. [5]
extending Theorem 5.1 to other distributions.
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Algorithm 3: PRIVINCREG2 (ǫ, δ)
Input: A stream Γ = (x1, y1), . . . , (xT , yT ), where each (xt, yt) in Γ is from the domain X × Y where
X ⊂ Rd with ‖X‖ ≤ 1 and Y ⊂ R with ‖Y‖ ≤ 1
Output: θprivt a differentially private estimate of θˆt ∈ argminθ∈C
∑t
i=1(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2 at every timestep t ∈ [T ]
1 Set ǫ′ ← ǫ2 , δ′ ← δ2 , κ←
log3/2(T )
√
log( 1δ′ )
ǫ′ , α
′ ← O(κ‖C‖√m), r ← Θ
((
1 + T‖C‖α′
)2)
,
γ ← (w(X )+w(C))1/3
T 1/3
, and m← Θ
(
1
γ2 max{(w(X ) + w(C))2, log(Tβ )}
)
2 Let Φ← m× d random matrix with entries drawn i.i.d. from N (0, 1/m)
3 for all t ∈ [T ] do
4 Let x˜t ← ‖xt‖‖Φxt‖xt
5 qt ← output of TREEMECH (ǫ′, δ′, 2) at t when invoked on the stream Φx˜1y1, . . . ,Φx˜T yT
6 Qt ← output of TREEMECH (ǫ′, δ′, 2) at t when invoked on the stream (Φx˜1)(Φx˜1)⊤, . . . , (Φx˜T )(Φx˜T )⊤
which can be viewed as m2-dimensional vectors (the outputs are converted back to form m×m matrices)
7 Define a private gradient function, gt : ΦC → Rm as:
gt(ϑ) = 2(Qtϑ− qt)
8 ϑprivt ← NOISYPROJGRAD(ΦC, gt, r) (described in Appendix B)
9 θprivt ← argminθ∈Rd ‖θ‖C subject to Φθ = ϑprivt (can be solved using any convex optimization technique)
10 Return θprivt
11 end
Note that ∇(Φθ)Lproj ∈ Rm.
Let ΦC = {ϑ ∈ Φθ : θ ∈ C}. Note for a convex C, ΦC ⊂ Rm is also convex. In Algorithm PRIVINCREG2,
ϑprivt is a private estimate of ϑˆt, where
ϑˆt ∈ argminϑ∈ΦC
t∑
i=1
(
yi − ‖xi‖‖Φxi‖〈Φxi, ϑ〉
)2
.
Algorithm PRIVINCREG2 only requires O(m2 log T + log d) space, therefore is slightly more memory efficient
than Algorithm PRIVINCREG1 (as m ≤ d). The time complexity can be analyzed as for Algorithm PRIVINCREG1.
Algorithm PRIVINCREG2 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to a single datapoint change in the stream Γ.
The L2-sensitivity for both invocations of Algorithm TREEMECH is 2. In Step 6, this holds because
max
xa,xb∈X
‖(Φx˜a)(Φx˜a)⊤ − (Φx˜b)(Φx˜b)⊤‖F ≤ ‖(Φx˜a)(Φx˜a)⊤‖F + ‖(Φx˜b)(Φx˜b)⊤‖F
= ‖Φx˜a‖2 + ‖Φx˜b‖2 = ‖xa‖2 + ‖xb‖2 = 2,
the second to last equality follows as, for every x ∈ X , ‖Φx˜‖ = ‖x‖ (by construction). Since Φxi’s are in the
projected subspace (Rm), the noise needed for differential privacy (in Steps 5 and 6) of Algorithm PRIVINCREG2
roughly scales as
√
m.
In Step 9 of Algorithm PRIVINCREG2, we lift ϑprivt into the original d-dimensional constraint space C. Since
ϑprivt ∈ ΦC, we know that there exists a θtruet ∈ C, such that Φθtruet = ϑprivt . Then the goal is to estimate θtruet
from Φθtruet . Again geometry of C (Gaussian width) plays an important role, as it controls the diameter of high-
dimensional random sections of C (referred to as M⋆ bound [35, 54]). We refer the reader to the excellent tutorial by
Vershynin [54] for more details.
We define Minkowski functional, as commonly used in geometric functional analysis and convex analysis.
Definition 6 (Minkowski functional). For any vector θ ∈ Rd, the Minkowski functional of C is the non-negative
number ‖θ‖C defined by the rule: ‖θ‖C = inf{ρ ∈ R : θ ∈ ρC}.
For the typical situation in ERM problems, where C is a symmetric convex body, ‖ · ‖C defines a norm. The
optimization problem solved in Step 9 of Algorithm PRIVINCREG2 is convex if C is convex, and hence can be
efficiently solved. The existence of θprivt follows from the following theorem.
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Theorem 5.3. [54] Let Φ be an m × d matrix, whose rows φ⊤1 , . . . , φ⊤m are i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors in Rd
chosen according to the standard normal distribution N (0, Id). Let C be a convex set. Given v = Φu and Φ, let uˆ
be the solution to the following convex program: minu′∈Rd ‖u′‖C subject to Φu′ = v. Then for any β > 0, with
probability at least 1− β,
sup
u:v=Φu
‖u− uˆ‖ = O
(
w(C)√
m
+
‖C‖√log(1/β)√
m
)
.
The next thing to be verified is that θprivt generated by Algorithm PRIVINCREG2 is in C. This is simple as by
definition of Minkowski functional, as any closed set C = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖C ≤ 1}. Hence, ‖θtruet ‖C ≤ 1. By choice
of θprivt in Step 9, ensures that ‖θprivt ‖C ≤ ‖θtruet ‖C ≤ 1, which guarantees that θprivt ∈ C. Finally, note that the
lifting is a post-processing operation on a differentially private output ϑprivt , and hence does not affect the differential
privacy guarantee.
Utility Analysis of Algorithm PRIVINCREG2. In Lemma 5.4, by using the fact that the Gaussian noise for pri-
vacy (in the Tree Mechanism) is added on a lower dimensional (m) instance, we show that the difference between
Lproj(θprivt ; Γt; Φ) and Lproj(θˆt; Γt; Φ) (the minimum empirical risk) roughly scales as
√
m, for sufficiently large
m. The Lipschitz constant of the function Lproj(θ; Γt; Φ) is O(‖ΦC‖), which by Theorem 5.1, with probability at
least 1− β is O(‖C‖), when
m = Θ((1/γ2)max{(w(X ) + w(C))2, log(T/β)}).
Let E0 be the event that the above Lipschitz bound holds.
Lemma 5.4. For any β > 0, with probability at least 1−β, for each t ∈ [T ], θprivt generated by Algorithm PRIVINCREG2
satisfies:
Lproj(θprivt ; Γt; Φ) −Lproj(θˆt; Γt; Φ) = O
(√
m log3/2 T
√
log(1/δ)‖C‖2
ǫ
)
where θˆt ∈ argminθ∈C
∑t
i=1(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2.
Proof. Let us condition on event E0 to hold. By definition,
min
ϑ∈ΦC
t∑
i=1
(
yi − ‖xi‖‖Φxi‖〈Φxi, ϑ〉
)2
≡ min
θ∈C
t∑
i=1
(
yi − ‖xi‖‖Φxi‖〈Φxi,Φθ〉
)2
.
Since the inputs are m-dimensional and ϑprivt = Φθ
priv
t , using an analysis similar to Theorem 4.2 gives that, with
probability at least 1− β, for each t ∈ [T ],
t∑
i=1
(
yi − ‖xi‖‖Φxi‖ 〈Φxi,Φθ
priv
t 〉
)2
−min
θ∈C
t∑
i=1
(
yi − ‖xi‖‖Φxi‖〈Φxi,Φθ〉
)2
= O
(
log3/2 T
√
log(1/δ)‖C‖2(√m+√log(T/β))
ǫ
)
.
In other words, with probability at least 1− β, for each t ∈ [T ],
Lproj(θprivt ; Γt; Φ) −min
θ∈C
Lproj(θ; Γt; Φ) = O
(
log3/2 T
√
log(1/δ)‖C‖2(√m+√log(T/β))
ǫ
)
.
By noting that minθ∈C Lproj(θ; Γt; Φ) ≤ Lproj(θˆt; Γt; Φ) and removing the conditioning on E0 (by adjusting β),
completes the proof.
Using properties of random projections, we now bound Lproj(θˆt; Γt; Φ) in terms of L(θˆt; Γt).
Lemma 5.5. LetΦ be a random matrix as defined in Theorem 5.1 withm = Θ((1/γ2)max{(w(X )+w(C))2, log(T/β)}),
and let β > 0. Then with probability at least 1− β, for each t ∈ [T ],
Lproj(θˆt; Γt; Φ) ≤ L(θˆt; Γt) + 4γ2‖C‖2t+ 2γ‖C‖
√
tL(θˆt; Γt) + 2
√
2γ3/2‖C‖3/2t3/4L(θˆt; Γt)1/4.
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Proof. Fix a t ∈ [T ]. From Theorem 5.1, for the chosen value of m, with probability at least 1− β,
L(θˆt; (x˜1, y1), . . . , (x˜t, yt)) =
t∑
i=1
(yi − 〈x˜i, θˆt〉)2
=
t∑
i=1
(
yi − ‖xi‖‖Φxi‖〈xi, θˆt〉
)2
≤
t∑
i=1
(|yi − 〈xi, θˆt〉|+ γ‖θˆt‖)2 ≤
t∑
i=1
(|yi − 〈xi, θˆt〉|+ γ‖C‖)2
≤ L(θˆt; Γt) + γ2‖C‖2t+ 2γ‖C‖
t∑
i=1
|yi − 〈xi, θˆt〉|
≤ L(θˆt; Γt) + γ2‖C‖2t+ 2γ‖C‖
√
tL(θˆt; Γt). (6)
Consider Lproj(θˆt; Γt; Φ). From Corollary 5.2, for the chosen value of m, with probability at least 1− β,
Lproj(θˆt; Γt; Φ) =
t∑
i=1
(yi − 〈Φx˜i,Φθˆt〉)2
≤
t∑
i=1
(|yi − 〈x˜i, θˆt〉|+ γ‖θˆt‖)2
≤
t∑
i=1
(|yi − 〈x˜i, θˆt〉|+ γ‖C‖)2
= L(θˆt; (x˜1, y1), . . . , (x˜t, yt)) + γ2‖C‖2t+ 2γ‖C‖
t∑
i=1
|yi − 〈x˜i, θˆt〉|
≤ L(θˆt; (x˜1, y1), . . . , (x˜t, yt)) + γ2‖C‖2t+ 2γ‖C‖
√
tL(θˆt; (x˜1, y1), . . . , (x˜t, yt)),
where the first inequality is by application of Corollary 5.2. Substituting the result from (6) and taking a union bound
over all t ∈ [T ] (i.e., replacing β by β/T ), completes the proof.
The next step is to lower bound Lproj(θprivt ; Γt; Φ) in terms of L(θprivt ; Γt).
Lemma 5.6. For any β > 0, with probability at least 1−β, for each t ∈ [T ], θprivt generated by Algorithm PRIVINCREG2
satisfies:
L(θprivt ; Γt) ≤ Lproj(θprivt ; Γt; Φ) + 2γ‖C‖
√
TL(θprivt ; Γt)
+ 2
√
2γ3/2‖C‖3/2T 3/4L(θprivt ; Γt)1/4 + 4γ2‖C‖2T.
Proof. Fix a t ∈ [T ]. For the chosen value of m,
Pr [|‖Φxi‖ − ‖xi‖| ≥ γ‖xi‖ for all i ∈ [t]] ≤ β.
Similarly for the chosen value of m by using (5),
Pr
[∣∣∣〈Φxi,Φθprivt 〉 − 〈xi, θprivt 〉∣∣∣ ≥ γ‖xi‖‖θprivt ‖ for all i ∈ [t]] ≤ β.
Using arguments as in Lemma 5.5, but by focusing on the lower bounds, we get that with probability at least 1− β,
Lproj(θprivt ; Γt; Φ) ≥ L(θprivt ; Γt)− 2γ‖C‖
√
TL(θprivt ; Γt)
− 2
√
2γ3/2‖C‖3/2T 3/4L(θprivt ; Γt)1/4 − 4γ2‖C‖2T.
Taking a union bound over all t ∈ [T ] completes the proof.
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Putting together Lemmas 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 and simple arithmetic manipulation gives: that with probability at least
1− β, for each t ∈ [T ],
L(θprivt ; Γt)−L(θˆt; Γt) = O
(√
m log3/2 T
√
log(1/δ)‖C‖2
ǫ
)
+ 8γ2‖C‖2T + 2γ‖C‖
√
TL(θˆt; Γt)
+ 2γ‖C‖
√
TL(θprivt ; Γt) + 2
√
2γ3/2‖C‖3/2T 3/4L(θprivt ; Γt)1/4 + 2
√
2γ3/2‖C‖3/2T 3/4L(θˆt; Γt)1/4. (7)
To simplify (7) in terms of its dependence on L(θprivt ; Γt), start by noting that it is of the form p− a√p− a3/2 4√p−
b− 2a2 ≥ 0, where
p = L(θprivt ; Γt),
a = 2γ‖C‖
√
T , and
b = L(θˆt; Γt) +O
(√
m log3/2 T
√
log(1/δ)‖C‖2
ǫ
)
+ 2γ‖C‖
√
TL(θˆt; Γt) + 2
√
2γ
3
2 ‖C‖ 32 T 34L(θˆt; Γt) 14 .
Solving for p from p − a√p − a3/2p1/4 − b − 2a2 = 0 (we use WolframAlpha solver [56]), and using that to
simplify (7) yields, that with probability at least 1− β, for each t ∈ [T ],
L(θprivt ; Γt)−L(θˆt; Γt) = O(
√
m log3/2 T
√
log(1/δ)‖C‖2
ǫ
+ γ2‖C‖2T + γ‖C‖
√
TL(θˆt; Γt) + γ3/2‖C‖3/2T 3/4L(θˆt; Γt)1/4). (8)
Theorem 5.7. Algorithm PRIVINCREG2 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to a single datapoint change
in the stream Γ. For any β > 0, with probability at least 1 − β, for each t ∈ [T ], θprivt generated by Algo-
rithm PRIVINCREG2 satisfies:
L(θprivt ; Γt)−L(θˆt; Γt) = O(
T
1
3W
2
3 log2 T‖C‖2√log(1/δ) log(1/β)
ǫ
+ T
1
6W
1
3 ‖C‖
√
L(θˆt; Γt) + T 14W 12 ‖C‖ 32 4
√
L(θˆt; Γt)),
where θˆt ∈ minθ∈C L(θ; Γt) and W = w(X ) + w(C).
Proof. The (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy follows from the established global sensitivity bound.
For the utility analysis, we start from (8), and substitute γ = (w(X )+w(C))1/3/T 1/3 to get the claimed bound.
The value of γ is picked to balance the various opposing factors.
Remark 5.8. Since L is an non-decreasing function in t, in the above theorem L(θˆt; Γt) in the right-hand side could
be replaced by L(θˆT ; ΓT ) (defined as OPT in the introduction).
5.2 Discussion about Theorem 5.7
We start this discussion by mentioning a few instantiations of Theorem 5.7. Let OPT = L(θˆT ; ΓT ) (remember, that
OPT ≤ T ). For simplicity, below we ignore dependence on the privacy and confidence parameters.
For arbitrary X and C, with just an L2-diameter assumption as in Theorem 4.2, W = w(X ) + w(C) = O(
√
d),
and therefore the excess risk bound provided by Theorem 5.7 (accounting for the trivial excess risk bound of T ) is
O˜(min{T 1/3d1/3+T 1/6d1/6√OPT+T 1/4d1/4 4√OPT, T}), which is worse than the O˜(min{√d, T}) excess risk
bound provided by Theorem 4.2. However, as we discuss below, for many interesting high-dimensional problems,
one could get substantially better bounds using Theorem 5.7. This happens when W is “small”.
In many practical regression instances, the input data is high-dimensional and sparse [38, 22, 59] which leads to
a small w(X ). For example, if the xi’s are k-sparse, then w(X ) = O(
√
k log(d/k)). Another common scenario is
to have the xi’s come from a bounded L1-diameter ball, in which case w(X ) = O(
√
log d). Now under any of these
assumptions, let us look at different choices of constraint spaces (C) that have a small Gaussian width.
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• If C = conv{a1, . . . , al} be convex hull of vectors ai ∈ Rd, such that for all i ∈ [d], ‖ai‖ ≤ c with c ∈ R+,
then w(C) = O(c√log l). A popular subcase of the above is the cross-polytope Bd1 (unit L1-ball). For example,
the popular Lasso formulation [50] used for high-dimensional linear regression is:
θˆt ∈ argminθ∈cBd
1
t∑
i=1
(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2.
Another popular subcase is the probability simplex where, C = {θ ∈ Rd : ∑i θi = 1, ∀i ∈ [d], θi ≥ 0}.
• Group/Block L1-norm is another prominent sparsity inducing norm used in many applications [1]. For a vector
θ ∈ Rd, and a parameter k, this norm is defined as:17
‖θ‖k,L1,2 =
⌈d/k⌉∑
i=1
√√√√√ min{ik,d}∑
j=(i−1)k+1
|θj |2.
If C denotes the convex set centered with radius one with respect to ‖ · ‖k,L1,2 -norm then the Gaussian width of C
is O(
√
k log(d/k)) [47].
• Lp-balls (1 < p < 2) are another popular choice of constraint space [40]. The regression problem in this case is
defined as:
θˆt ∈ argminθ∈cBdp
t∑
i=1
(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2,
and w(cBdp) = O(cd1−1/p).
As the reader may notice, in all of the above problem settings, W is much smaller than
√
d. As a comparison
to the bound in Theorem 4.2, if W = O(polylog(d)), then Theorem 5.7 yields an excess risk bound of O˜(T 1/3 +
T 1/6
√
OPT + T 1/4 4
√
OPT). This is significantly better than the O˜(
√
d) risk bound from Theorem 4.2 for many
setting of T, d, and OPT, e.g., if d≫ T 4/3.
One could also compare the result from Theorem 5.7 to the bound obtained by applying the differentially private
ERM algorithm of Talwar et al. [46] in the generic mechanism (Theorem 3.1, Part 3). It is hard to do a precise
comparison because of the dependence on different parameters in these bounds. In general, when OPT is not very
big (say ≪ T 2/3) and W = O(polylog(d)) then the excess risk bound from Theorem 5.7 is significantly better than
O˜(
√
T ) risk bound obtained in Theorem 3.1, Part 3.
Extension to a case where not all inputs are drawn from a domain with small Gaussian Width. The previous
analysis assumes that w(X ) is small (all inputs are drawn from a domain with small Gaussian Width). We now show
that the techniques and results in the previous section extend to a more robust setting, where not all inputs are assumed
to come from a domain with small Gaussian width.
In particular, we assume that there exists a set G ⊆ X , such that w(G) is small, and only some inputs in the
stream come from G (e.g., only a fraction of the covariates could be sparse). We also assume that the algorithm
has access to an oracle which given a point x ∈ X , returns whether x ∈ G or not. The goal of the algorithm
is to perform private incremental linear regression on inputs from G. In a non-private world, this is trivial as the
algorithm can simply ignore when xt is not in G, but this operation is not private. However, a simple change to
Algorithm PRIVINCREG2 can handle this scenario without a breach in the privacy. The idea is to check whether
xt ∈ G, if so (xt, yt) is used as currently in Algorithm PRIVINCREG2. Otherwise, (xt, yt) is replaced by (0, 0)
before invoking Algorithm TREEMECH (in Steps 5 and 6 of Algorithm PRIVINCREG2). With this change, the
resulting algorithm is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, and with probability at least 1−β, for each t ∈ [T ], its output θprivt
will satisfy:
∑
xi∈G,i∈[t]
(yi − 〈xi, θprivt 〉)2 −
∑
xi∈G,i∈[t]
(yi − 〈xi, θˆt〉)2 = O(T
1
3W
2
3 log2 T‖C‖2√log(1/δ) log(1/β)
ǫ
+ T
1
6W
1
3 ‖C‖
√
L(θˆt; Γt) + T 14W 12 ‖C‖ 32 4
√
L(θˆt; Γt)),
where θˆt ∈ minθ∈C
∑
xi∈G,i∈[t](yi − 〈xi, θ〉)
2 and W = w(G) +w(C).
17There are generalizations of this norm that can handle different group (block) sizes.
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A Additional Preliminaries
We start by reviewing some standard definitions in convex optimization. In our setting, for a loss function (θ; z),
all the following properties (such as convexity, Lipschitzness, strong convexity) are defined with respect to the first
argument θ.
In the following, we use the notation ∇(θ; z) to denote the gradient (if it exists) or any subgradient of function
(·; z) at θ.
Definition 7. (Convex Functions) A loss function  : C × Z → R is convex with respect to θ over the domain C
if for all z ∈ Z the following inequality holds: (λθa + (1 − λ)θb; z) ≤ λ · (θa; z) + (1 − λ) · (θb; z) for all
θa, θb ∈ C and λ ∈ [0, 1]. For a continuously differentiable , this inequality can be equivalently replaced with:
(θb; z) ≥ (θa; z) + 〈∇(θa; z), θb − θa〉 for all θa, θb ∈ C, where ∇(θa; z) is the gradient of (·; z) at θa.
Definition 8. (Lipschitz Functions) A loss function  : C × Z → R is L-Lipschitz with respect to θ over the domain
C, if for all z ∈ Z and θa, θb ∈ C, we have |(θa; z) − (θb; z)| ≤ L‖θa − θb‖. If  is a convex function, then  is
L-Lipschitz iff for all θ ∈ C and subgradients g of  at θ we have ‖g‖ ≤ L.
Definition 9. (Strongly Convex Functions) A loss function  : C × Z → R is ν-strongly convex if for all z ∈ Z and
θa, θb ∈ C, all subgradients g of (θa; z), we have (θb; z) ≥ (θa; z) + 〈g, θb − θa〉 + (ν/2)‖θb − θa‖2 (i.e.,  is
bounded below by a quadratic function tangent at θa).
Gaussian Norm Bounds. LetN (0, σ2) denote the Gaussian (normal) distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2. We
use the following standard result on the spectral norm (largest singular value) of an i.i.d. Gaussian random matrix
throughout this paper.
Proposition A.1. Let A be an N×n matrix whose entries are independent standard normal random variables. Then
for every t > 0, with probability at least 1− 2 exp(−t2/2) one has, ‖A‖ = O(√N +√n+ t). In particular, with
probability at least 1− β, ‖A‖ = O(√N +√n+√log(1/β)).
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A.1 Background on Linear Regression
Linear regression is a statistical method used to create a linear model. It attempts to model the relationship between
two variables (known as covariate-response pairs) by fitting a linear function to observed data. More formally, given
y = Xθ⋆ +w, where y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn is a vector of observed responses, X ∈ Rn×d is the covariate matrix
in which ith row x⊤i represents the covariates (features) for the ith observation, and w = (w1, . . . , wn) is a noise
vector, the goal of linear regression is to estimate the unknown regression vector θ⋆.
Assuming that the noise vector w follows a (sub)Gaussian distribution, estimating θ⋆ amounts to solving the
ordinary least-squares problem:
θˆ ∈ argminθ∈Rd ‖y −Xθ‖2 = argminθ∈Rd
n∑
i=1
(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2.
Typically, for additional guarantees such as sparsity and stability, constraints are added to the least-squares estimator.
This leads to the constrained linear regression formulation:
Linear Regression: θˆ ∈ argminθ∈C ‖y −Xθ‖2 = argminθ∈C
n∑
i=1
(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2, (9)
for some convex set C ⊆ Rd. In this paper, we work with this formulation. Two well-known regression problems are
obtained by choosing C as the L2/L1-ball:
Ridge Regression: θˆ ∈ argminθ∈cBd
2
∑n
i=1(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2,
Lasso Regression: θˆ ∈ argminθ∈cBd
1
∑n
i=1(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2,
where c ∈ R+. Another popular example is the Elastic-net regression which combines the Lasso and Ridge regres-
sion. Note that, while in this paper we focus on the constrained formulation of regression, from duality and the KKT
conditions, the constrained formulation is equivalent to a penalized (regularized) formulation.
In the Streaming Setting. Let Γ = (x1, y1), . . . , (xT , yT ) denote a data stream. Let Γt denote the stream prefix of
Γ of length t. Informally, the goal of incremental linear regression is to release at each timestep t ∈ [T ], θt ∈ C, that
minimizes L(θ; Γt) =∑ti=1(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2.
Definition 10 (Adaptation of Definition 1 for Incremental Linear Regression). A randomized streaming algorithm is
(α, β)-estimator for incremental linear regression, if with probability at least 1−β over the coin flips of the algorithm,
for each t ∈ [T ], after processing a prefix of the stream of length t, it generates an output θt ∈ C that satisfies the
following bound on excess (empirical) risk:
t∑
i=1
(yi − 〈xi, θt〉)2 −
(
min
θ∈C
t∑
i=1
(yi − 〈xi, θ〉)2
)
≤ α.
A.2 Background on Differential Privacy
In this section, we review some basic constructions in differential privacy. The literature on differential privacy is
now rich with tools for constructing differentially private analyses, and we refer the reader to a survey by Dwork and
Roth [18] for a comprehensive review of developments there.
One of the most basic technique, for achieving differential privacy is by adding noise to the outcome of a computed
function where the noise magnitude is scaled to the (global) sensitivity of the function defined as:
Definition 11 (Sensitivity). Let f be a function mapping streams Γ ∈ Z∗ to Rd. The L2-sensitivity ∆2 of f is the
maximum of ‖f(Γ)− f(Γ′)‖ over neighboring streams Γ,Γ′.
Theorem A.2 (Framework of Global Sensitivity [15]). Let f : Z∗ → Rd be a function with L2-sensitivity ∆2. The
algorithm that on an input Γ outputs f(Γ) + Y whereY ∼ N (0, (2∆22 ln(2/δ))/ǫ2)d is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Composition theorems for differential privacy allow a modular design of privacy preserving algorithms based on
algorithms for simpler sub tasks:
Theorem A.3 ([14]). A mechanism that permits k adaptive interactions with mechanisms that preserves (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy (and does not access the database otherwise) ensures (kǫ, kδ)-differential privacy.
A stronger composition is also possible as shown by Dwork et al. [19].
Theorem A.4 ([19]). Let ǫ, δ, δ∗ > 0 and ǫ ≤ 1. A mechanism that permits k adaptive interactions with mechanisms
that preserves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy ensures (ǫ√2k ln(1/δ∗) + 2kǫ2, kδ + δ∗)-differential privacy.
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B Noisy Projected Gradient Descent
In this section, we investigate the convergence rate of noisy projected gradient descent. Williams and McSherry first
investigated gradient descent with noisy updates for probabilistic inference [55]; noisy stochastic variants of gradient
descent have also been studied by [25, 12, 45, 2] in various private convex optimization settings. Other convex
optimization techniques such as mirror descent [13, 47] and Frank-Wolfe scheme [47] have also been considered for
designing private ERM algorithms.
For completeness, in this section, we present an analysis of the projected gradient descent procedure that oper-
ates with only access to a private gradient function (Definition 5). The analysis relies on standard ideas in convex
optimization literature.
Consider the following constrained optimization problem,
min
θ∈C
f(θ) where C ⊆ Rd, (10)
where f : Rd → R is a convex function and C is some non-empty closed convex set. Define projection of θ ∈ Rd
onto a convex set C as:
PC(θ) = argminz∈C ‖θ − z‖2.
Projected gradient descent algorithm uses the following update to solve (10)
PROJGRAD(C, r) : Initialize θ1 ∈ C,Repeat r times: θk+1 = PC(θk − ηk∇f(θk)), Output θ¯ = 1
r
r∑
i=1
θi, (11)
for some stepsize ηk. Here PC(θ) defines the projection of θ onto C.
Let g : Rd → Rd be an (α, β)-approximation of the true gradient of f (as in Definition 5),
Pr
[
max
θ∈C
‖g(θ)−∇f(θ)‖ > α
]
≤ β.
The noisy projected gradient descent is a simple modification of the projected gradient descent algorithm (11), where
instead of the true gradient, a noisy gradient is used. In other words, noisy projected gradient descent takes the form,
NOISYPROJGRAD(C, g, r) : Initialize θ1 ∈ C,Repeat r times: θk+1 = PC(θk − ηkg(θk)), Output θ¯ = 1
r
r∑
i=1
θi.
(12)
The following proposition analyzes the convergence of the above NOISYPROJGRAD procedure assuming g is an
(α, β)-approximation of the true gradient of f . Note that the proposition holds, even if f is not differentiable, in
which case, ∇f(θ) represents any subgradient of f at θ.
Proposition B.1. Suppose f is convex and is L-Lipschitz. Let ‖C‖ be the diameter of C. Let g : Rd → Rd be an
(α, β)-approximation of the true gradient of f . Then after r steps of Algorithm NOISYPROJGRAD, starting with any
θ0 ∈ C and constant stepsize of ηk = ‖C‖√r(α+L) , with probability at least 1− rβ,
f(θ¯)− f(θ∗) ≤ (α+ L)‖C‖√
r
+ α‖C‖.
Proof. Let θ∗ ∈ C be the optimal solution of (10). Let g(θk) = ∇f(θk) + e(θk). By Definition 8, L ≥
maxθ∈C ‖∇f(θ)‖.
‖xk+1 − θ∗‖2 = ‖PC(θk − ηkg(θk))− PC(θ∗)‖2
≤ ‖θk − ηkg(θk)− θ∗‖2
≤ ‖θk − θ∗‖2 + 2ηk〈g(θk), θ∗ − θk〉+ η2k‖g(θk)‖2
= ‖θk − θ∗‖2 + 2ηk〈∇f(θk) + e(θk), θ∗ − θk〉+ η2k‖∇f(θk) + e(θk)‖2
≤ ‖θk − θ∗‖2 + 2ηk〈∇f(θk), θ∗ − θk〉+ 2ηk‖e(θk)‖‖C‖+ η2k‖∇f(θk) + e(θk)‖2
≤ ‖θk − θ∗‖2 + 2ηk(f(θ∗)− f(θk)) + 2ηk‖e(θk)‖‖C‖+ η2k(‖∇f(θk)‖2 + ‖e(θk)‖2 + 2‖∇f(θk)‖‖e(θk)‖)
≤ ‖θk − θ∗‖2 + 2ηk(f(θ∗)− f(θk)) + 2ηk‖e(θk)‖‖C‖+ η2k(L2 + ‖e(θk)‖2 + 2L‖e(θk)‖).
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The first inequality follows because projection cannot increase distances (projection operator is contractive).
By the assumption on g(θk), with probability at least 1−β, ‖e(θk)‖ ≤ α. Hence, with probability at least 1−β,
‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 ≤ ‖θk − θ∗‖2 + 2ηk(f(θ∗)− f(θk)) + 2ηkα‖C‖+ η2k(L2 + α2 + 2αL).
Summing the above expression and taking a union bound, yields that with probability at least 1− rβ,
0 ≤ ‖θr+1 − θ∗‖2 ≤ ‖θ1 − θ∗‖2 + 2
r∑
k=1
ηk(f(θ
∗)− f(θk)) + 2rηkα‖C‖+ rη2k(L2 + α2 + 2αL).
Rearranging the above, and setting constant step size ηk = ‖C‖√r(α+L) , with probability at least 1− rβ,
r∑
k=1
(f(θk)− f(θ∗)) ≤ ‖C‖
√
r(α+ L) + rα‖C‖.
Now by Jensen’s inequality,
f(θ¯) = f
(
1
r
r∑
k=1
θk
)
≤ 1
r
r∑
k=1
f(θk).
Therefore,
f(θ¯)− f(θ∗) ≤ 1
r
r∑
k=1
(f(θk)− f(θ∗)) ≤ (α+ L)‖C‖√
r
+ α‖C‖.
Corollary B.2. By setting r = (α+L)
2‖C‖2
ζ2
, in Proposition B.1 gives that with probability at least 1− rβ,
f(θ¯)− f(θ∗) ≤ ζ + α‖C‖.
If α > 0, then we can set r = (1 + L
α
)2 gives f(θ¯)− f(θ∗) ≤ 2α‖C‖.
After constructing the private gradient function, evaluating the gradient function at any θ can be done without
affecting the privacy budget, as this is just a post-processing of private outputs.
C Tree Mechanism for Continually Releasing Private Sums
Given a bit stream b1, . . . , bT ∈ {0, 1}, the private streaming counter problem is to release at every timestep t, (an
approximation to) ∑ti=1 bi while satisfying differential privacy (Definition 4). Chan et al. [7] and Dwork et al. [16]
proposed an elegant differentially private mechanism (referred to as the Tree Mechanism) for this problem. We use
this mechanism as a basic building block in our private incremental regression algorithms.18
For completeness, in Algorithm TREEMECH, we present the entire Tree Mechanism as applied to a set of vectors.
Given a data stream Υ = υ1, . . . , υT ∈ Z, the algorithm releases at each timestep t, (an approximation to) the sum
function
∑t
i=1 υi, while satisfying differential privacy.
Algorithm TREEMECH can be viewed as releasing partial sums of different ranges at each timestep t and comput-
ing the final sum is simply a post-processing of the partial sums. At most log T partial sums are used for constructing
each private sum. The following theorem follows by using the standard upper deviation inequality for Gaussian ran-
dom variables (Proposition A.1) in the analysis of Tree Mechanism from [16, 7]. Another advantage of this mechanism
is that it can be implemented with small memory, as only O(log t) partial sums are needed at any time t.
Proposition C.1. Algorithm TREEMECH is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to a single datapoint change in
the stream Υ. For any β > 0 and t ∈ [T ], with probability at least 1 − β, st computed by Algorithm TREEMECH
satisfies: ∥∥∥∥∥st −
t∑
i=1
υi
∥∥∥∥∥ = O
(
∆2(
√
d+
√
log (1/β)) log3/2 T
√
log (1/δ)
ǫ
)
,
where ∆2 is the L2-sensitivity of the sum function from Definition 11.
18Dwork et al. [17] have recently improved the bounds for the private streaming counter problem in the case where the bit stream is sparse, i.e.,
have many fewer 1’s than 0’s.
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Algorithm 4: TREEMECH (ǫ, δ,∆2)
Input: A stream Υ = υ1, . . . , υT , where each υt is from the domain Z ⊆ Rd, and ∆2 = maxυ,υ′∈Z ‖υ − υ′‖
Output: A differentially private estimate of
∑t
i=1 υi at every timestep t ∈ [T ]
1 for all t ∈ [T ] do
2 Express t =
∑log t
j=0 2
jBinj(t) (where Binj(t) is the bit at the jth index in the binary representation of t)
3 i← min0≤j≤log T {Binj(t) 6= 0}
4 ai ←
∑
j<i aj + υt
5 for 0 ≤ j ≤ i− 1 do
6 aj ← 0 and bj ← 0
7 end
8 bi ← ai +N
(
0,
2 log2(T )∆2
2
ln(2/δ)Id
ǫ2
)
9 st ←
∑
j:Binj(t) 6=0
bj
10 Return st
11 end
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